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A high-level, low-resolution (HLLR) stochastic model for evaluating the benefits of a 
Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP) is described. The model focuses on the 
sensor-to-shooter information needed by elements of a joint force to engage time critical 
Targets. The model includes realistic random delays or latency caused by congestion or 
system unreliability, random times until Target detection and loss, and a probabilistic 
representation of the Services’ overall capability to detect, classify and shoot at a varying 
set of different Target types. The model results support the following conclusions. CROP 
can increase the number of time-critical Targets killed, sometimes considerably; CROP 
can decrease the mean and variance of the number of weapons expended to kill Targets; 
the benefits of CROP can be degraded if the CROP process requires more time from 
Target detection until weapon arrival at the Target. 
2 
1. Introduction and Summary 
This paper describes and illustrates a high-level, low-resolution (HLLR) stochastic scoping 
model, CROPDUSTER, or CD, for evaluating the CROP (Common Relevant Operational 
Picture). The CROP is defined as a presentation of timely, fused, accurate, assured, and relevant 
information that can be tailored to meet the requirements of a joint force and is common to every 
organization and individual involved in a joint operation; (U.S. Joint Forces Command (2000)). 
The CROP architecture is attractive since the (Blue) Services (e.g., Army, Air Force, Navy and 
Marines) have tended to focus on individual “stove-piped” (SP) systems that are, in most cases, 
not entirely interoperable. The vision for the CROP system is that it provides for all the data, 
information, and knowledge needs of joint warfare with minimal latency and maximal attainable 
precision and lethality. The model of this paper focuses on sensor-to-shooter information needed 
by elements of a joint force to engage enemy forces. 
Here CROP capability is compared to the targeting of a variety of Red-force types by several 
uncoordinated Service forces with their own individual combined Sensor-Shooter systems, but 
which do not share information with other Services, informally called a SP architecture. The 
CROP capability permits rapid transfer of any detection information to all (relevant) Services, 
and then a quick decision as to which Services actually best Target the detected Red unit. 
Realistic delays or latency caused by congestion or system unreliability (hardware, software, or 
human) may be, and are, addressed implicitly by reduction of task processing rates. 
The models include representation of the Services’ overall capability to detect, classify and 
shoot at a varying set of different Target types (R in all; a generic type is r, for examples in the 
paper R=3 throughout). In the SP model the Services may each individually Target the same Red 
unit (e.g., one or more tanks), expending weapons unnecessarily and inefficiently. In the CROP 
organization this will occur much less frequently, so combat efficiency can be enhanced. Our 
models permit analytical but probabilistic comparisons of the SP and CROP organizations. Our 
version of an SP model is tilted somewhat unrealistically towards too much individual Service 
isolation, while the present CROP model may assume too-efficient information coordination. 
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This accentuates the advantage of CROP over SP in general, but the account of stochastic 
variability tends to put the likely advantage of CROP (for the examples provided) into 
perspective. The variability between, and within, individual campaigns that use SP or (partial or 
total) CROP can be substantial. 
2. Models and MOEs of UnCoordinated (SP) Sensor-Shooter Systems  
2.1  Scenario 
A region of a battlespace, B, is under the surveillance of the sensor assets of S (S ≥ 1, but 2 or 
more is more interesting) Services. Assume for the moment that these systems are completely SP 
and operate independently, sharing information within but without sharing information between 
Services. Information obtained by the myriad of sensor types within a Service (e.g., the Army) is 
shared, and can be parameterized as a Service-wide detection rate ξrs (e.g., unit of measure 
1/hrs.) meaning that 1/ξrs is the mean time to detect one Red unit of type r, r {0, 1, … R } by 
the collaborating sensor assets of Service s, where s
∈
∈{1, 2, … , S} denotes the sth Service. The 
random variable Trs, denoting the time to such a detection, is conveniently taken first to be 
exponentially distributed, although this distributional assumption can often be easily relaxed; if 
the assumption is relaxed, then let Trs have the general distribution , where the solid dot 
• indicates that other variables may condition F; the default is a “constant” distribution omitting 
other influential variables. For the present, all examples are for exponential default conditions. 
We define the collection of all sensor assets of a Service s to be its sensor System. Our model 




rs, r = 0, 1, …, R; s = 1, 2, … S} are all independent, a consequence of the 
assumption that Blue has ample sensor and shooter capability. 
Note:  Spatial/geographic issues and Red maneuver effects come later; but not in this paper. 
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2.2 Example Question 1:  Time for System to Achieve Detection 
Suppose a Red unit, type r, enters B at initial time t = 0; all Services’ sensor systems are 
present. 
(A) Red Unit Detection by Single Service, s 
For a Service, s, sensor System, the probability of detection by fixed time t > 0, is modeled 
as 
{ } 1 0
0; 0
; , T rstrs rsP t e t
t
ξ ξ− 0>  ≤ = − ≥
= <    (2.1) 
In (2.1) the clock starts when an r-type unit first becomes available for detection by Service 
s. Note that this can occur either by r entering the region in which s is already present, or by the 
sensors of Service s entering the region where Red units of type r are already present. 
Furthermore, Trs is (conditionally on availability time t, and possibly on environmental and 
terrain conditions) independent of Tru, for different-Service sensor Systems s and u, as stated 
above. 
 (B) Red Unit Detection Under Independence of Blue Service Sensor Systems 
 To complete the probability that all s Services fail to detect a unit of type r in time t after the 
latter is available in B, we assume all Services are capable of detecting the unit. By 
independence, 























    (2.2)                                
where rT  is the time for some Service sensor to detect item r, so the time to detection by some 







= ∑ . This is equivalent to a 
detection by the entire system under CROP, assuming instant information sharing. Under SP, the 
probability that first detection is by System s is rs rξ ξ . In this architecture assume that Target 
prosecution is by System s but also by subsequent Other-than-s, i.e., s , services acting 
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independently, until the Target is (i) lost from track, or (ii) targeted, shot at, and abandoned as 
(apparently) killed. 
(C) Summary of Initial Detection Model 
 Suppose a Target of type r becomes available for detection at time t = 0. Then 
(a) Under uncoordinated Service architecture (SP) the first Service to detect it carries out 
initial prosecution, i.e., until (i) lost, or (ii) declared dead. If not killed, the Target must 
be re-detected, and this occurs at the same detection rate, rξ . As other Services detect, 
they independently join the attack, which stops when the target is killed. 
(b) Under CROP architecture the first Service to detect the Target immediately (negligible 
latency time initially) shares the information with all other Services. We also study the 
effect of adding a constant non-zero latency. This allows a cooperative effort to classify 
the target, and, subject to that joint classification, to shoot at it. 
 Our model allows the advantage of an idealized CROP to be compared to the more 
traditional SP architecture. In fact, the contrast provided is a stark caricature, since some 
information sharing is realistically present today. The numbers may therefore tend to exaggerate 
the CROP advantage. 
(D) Generalized Detection Model 
 The detection rates { }rsξ may vary irregularly (“randomly”) and simultaneously from time to 
time, e.g., day to day, because of say, environmental (weather) changes. 
Quick Mixing 
 To represent such effects one can first replace the exponent rstξ  in (2.1) conditionally by 
 where  is a random hazard (see Gaver (1963), and Cox and Lewis (1966)). 
Normalize so that the drift 
( )rs tξ H ( )tH
( )E t t=  H  but with adjustable variability; one convenient model is 
the gamma process, with independent but variable time increments, and  
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−∈ = ΓH     (2.3) 
so 




s t sE e e
µ µ µ
µ
 − − + −    = + =     
H     (2.4) 
and 
           ( ) ( ), tE t t Var t ;µ=      H H =     (2.5) 
the expression for Var ( )t  H  shows that the variance of detection rate per unit time decreases 
as µ  increases. Furthermore, expression (2.4) shows that the marginal probability that an  
r-Target escapes detection for time t, as in (2.2) remains exponential in form, but with rate 
parameter ( )rln 1µ ξ µ+ . This rate parameter tends to zero if 0µ →  (so variance of detection 
rate becomes large), and, if µ → ∞  tends to rξ . 
Slow Mixing 
 An alternative model is obtained by replacing each detection rate parameter by rsξ ε  where 
ε  is a random perturbing parameter prevailing throughout the campaign. In this case the 
exponential survival function of (2.2) becomes, conditionally, 
      { } ,r trP t e ξ−> = εεT  
and removal of the condition gives 
      { } r trP t E e ξ− > =  εT  
which is the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of the distribution of ε . Two convenient possibilities 
are the gamma normalized with mean unity and the positive stable law (Feller(1966)). 
 For the gamma with shape-scale parameter , 0β β<  
      { } 1 rr tP t
βξ
β
− > = +  T  
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and for the stable law with shape parameter 0 1α< < , 
      { } ( )r trP t e αξ−> =Τ . 
Both such models have slower-than-exponential decay, i.e., with long, Pareto, tails. They can be 
used to represent the difficulties caused by terrain features. 
3. Shooting, Losses, and Target Survival:  The Case of UnCoordinated  
Sensor-Shooters (SP Architecture) 
 After a characteristic type r (r = 0, 1, … R) potential Red Target is Detected it must next be 
Classified or Identified, Tracked for some time (and “mensurated”), and perceived-to-be-
appropriate weapons shot at it (this may include abstaining if the type is perceived to be r = 0, 
denoting a false target or Decoy). We call this last step a Shot, although the attack may be a 
sequence of shots, e.g., a salvo, or a quick Shoot-Look-Shoot sequence. 
3.1 Losses During Track, and Kill Rate 
 Assume for the present that the detection rate on the Target for Service s is ξrs, as before. 
When the detection time, T , terminates in Detection, then Classification and Mensuration 
occur, followed by one or more Shots; the shot result may be either a Kill or a Miss. If a Kill, the 
Target is deleted (if a Decoy is correctly identified, it is “removed” with no shots fired, which is 
equivalent to permanently identified). If a Miss (perhaps after a quick Shoot-Look-Shoot 
sequence), the Target simply returns to the environment. Note that in the model for the SP case 
there is negligible probability that any two or more Targets will be prosecuted simultaneously 
(i.e., during precisely the same engagement period); different Services can prosecute the same 
Target at different times. However, deliberate simultaneous prosecution is possible in the CROP 
case if it were decided to shoot at a particular Target “simultaneously” with several Weapons, 
possibly from different Services.  
rs
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3.2 The Killing Time Process Under SP 
 Let Krs denote the random time for Service s to kill a type r Red Target. In other words, this 
time is the first of possibly several attempts (searches, plus classification, plus tracking and 
mensuration and finally shots) that actually kills the Target; a more realistic model might permit 
the Target to leave the region alive. This option is developed in an appendix, as is gradual 
infiltration of the region by Reds. 
 At the termination of a search time, a tracking and attempted classification event is initiated. 
While this event is in progress, two competing subevents are in process:   
 (a) the Target may be lost from track, which occurs at rate υ rs , the parameter of an 
assumed “fast” (compared to ξrs) exponential distribution meaning υ rs is large compared 
to rξ ; or  
 (b) the Target is classified, and a weapon or attack launched and completed before track 
loss occurs; this has rate , again the parameter of an independent “fast” exponential.  rso
 The consequence is that the rate at which either (a) or (b) occurs is rs rsoυ + , the parameter 
of a “faster” exponential distribution that terminates with event (a) with probability 
( )rsrs rs rsq o
υ
υ= + , and with event (b) with probability ( )rsrs rs
op υ= + rso . This latter is the 
probability that classification and shooting can begin. This is an approximation that can be 
relaxed if desired, but it is a reasonable and convenient initial approach. 
 For simplicity we ignore here the actual tracking time with mean ( )
1
rs rsoυ + , but maintain 
the probabilities , and , that must sum to one. qrs prs
 Here is the structure of the killing-time random variable for 

















where  is a random independent replica of  (“start over”). The parameter ′Krs Krs
     ( ) ( ) ( )rs rs rj jk rk
j k
p c s d s s∗ = ∑ ∑κ      (3.2) κ
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represents the kill or success of the entire Track/Classification-Shoot and Re-Shoot process, 
which here is assumed to be the same at each opportunity. In (3.2) represents the 
probability that if a k-type weapon is fired by System s at Target type r that the Target is killed. 
( )rk sκ
 The decision sequence leading to  involves the classification matrix, κ rs* c srj b g , which 
provides the conditional (on true type, i.e., r) probability that the unit is actually classified and 
treated as a type  when an s-type Service methodology is applied. There is also a 
decision probability matrix 
j ∈ 0 1 2, , , ...b Rg
d sjk b g , and it provides the conditional probability that a unit 
classified as a j is weaponeered/shot as a . Finally, there is the conditional kill 
probability that a weapon appropriate for a Target of type r, perceived to be of type j, is shot-at 
by a weapon appropriate for a Target of type . For a single-shot engagement by 
Service s, the rate of kill (per surviving Target of type r) is  
k ∈ 0 1 2, , , ...b
k ∈ 1 2, , ...b
Rg
Rg
    ( ) ( ) ( )( )rs rs rs rj jk rk rs rs
j k
K p c s d s sη ξ κ ξ κ ∗= =∑ ∑ .   (3.3) 
Note that the probability  is desirably near unity if j = k (otherwise zero), meaning that 
to every Target perceived as a type j there is a most appropriate weapon. However, if the supply 
of j-optimal weapons is low or exhausted, substitution will occur (the finite-supply issue is not 
yet modeled). If j = 0, then the r-type Target is perceived as a decoy, and so one option is not to 
fire (though it may help to shoot, and hence eliminate, decoys). 
d sjk b g
The above development implies that  has the exponential distribution with rate Krs
( )rs rs rsKη ξ κ ∗= , which is, in words, the rate of s-Service search success at finding an r-type 
Target, multiplied by the overall probability of a successful kill. This is, the time rate of 
kill, per surviving Red type r, of Service s, on the remaining type-r Reds. 
 We use the above in our further development, but recognize that a variety of different 
modeling possibilities exist and require investigation. 
 Note:  Specific sensor-related properties are here summarized only by (a) rate of detection, 
and (b) probability of correct—or incorrect—classification (including Battle Damage 
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Assessment BDA)) skill; all are represented here by c s r Rrj b g b g, , , , ...  ∈ 0 1 2  and 
. The closer  is to a diagonal matrix, j ∈ 0 1, , ...b Rg rjc ( )rr 1c s =  for all r, the more skillful the 
classification. Here both are composites of many within-Service platform-sensor combinations, 
and both are candidates for improvement. The current CROPDUSTER model enables the analyst 
to evaluate tradeoffs between such technological changes as well as features such as the 
architecture and CONOPS for the CROP. 
 The expression (3.1) results in the (complement of the) distribution of killing time of a 
particular, surviving Red, of type r, from an arbitrary start time, t 0=  
    ( ) { } ( )exprs rs rsG t P t K tη≡ > = −  K .    (3.4) 
3.3  UnCoordinated (SP) Survival 
 This allows calculation of the r-type individual survival probability in the SP architecture: 
    















 = − = −       
=
∑∏
   (3.5) 







= ∑ s K  is the overall rate of kill of individual Targets of type r. Our 
assumption is that Blue resources are adequate to locate and kill any and all targets available 
independently. Of course rsξ  depends on Blue force size, Bs(t). The overall parameter ( )r Kη  
neatly encapsulates all individual Service classification, weapon choice and effectiveness 
parameterseven potentially imperfect BDA and re-shooting options. The present model and 
example assume “perfect BDA,” which can easily be rectified. The exponential form is a great 
convenience, but not essential (however, it is compatible with classical search theory). It is 
assumed that when an r-type Target is killed (by Service s with probability ( ) ( )rs rKη η K ) all 
other Services immediately cease shooting at that particular Target. 
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3.4  Red System Survival, by Unit Type, and Force-Wide 
The assumptions of independence imply that , the number of r-type Targets surviving 
out of 
( )r tX
rX  initially present with no reinforcements, is Binomially distributed with mean 
       [ ] ( )( ) r K tr rX e η−=XE t     (3.6) 
and variance 
    [ ] ( ) ( )( )riance ( ) 1r rVa K tr rt X e eη η− −= −X K t     (3.7,a) 
so 
   [ ] ( ) ( )( )Standard Deviation ( ) 1r rK tr rt X e eη η− −= −X K t   (3.7,b) 
The first approximation to the distribution of  is the Normal;  is approximately 
normal for large 
( )r tX ( )r tX
rX . 













= ∑ X t
is a sum of independent Binomial random variables with mean 







E t X e η−
=
=   ∑Y     (3.9) 
and  the sum of the variances of the r-types. ( )Variance t Y 
ξ rs
Numerical illustrations are provided in a later section. 
3.5  CROP Survival 
A different calculation is needed to express killing time when System-first detection 
information is shared. Assume System detection occurs when the first Service detection of an  
r-type occurs; for the present model, the time for this event to occur is exponentially distributed 
with rate . The CROP architecture assumption is, then, that the detected Target is 
classified and assigned to the Service Shooter with the highest perceived kill probability after an 








c  it is classified as Target of type A  and assigned to 
the Service, s , where s  identifies that Service for which the predicted kill probability, 
SrAb g
Ab g Ab g
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One way to express this is to suppose that System-level classification is conducted according 
to a System-Level Uncertainty matrix:  ( )( )rc S  A . We address later a variety of alternative 
derivations of ( )c  . A Bayesian methodology for combining data from all Services is described 
in Appendix B. If the Target is of type r, but is classified by the System as an A  (quite possibly 
incorrectly), then one decision option is to pick that Service to shoot at the Target that has the 
largest kill probability against an A :  arg max
s
sκ AAb g ; call that Service , so the actual kill 
probability would be . Then the CROP kill probability against an r (type unknown) is 
s Ab g
( )(r sκ A A )
( ) ( )
1




, where ( )rp C  is the probability that a weapon or attack can be 
launched and reaches the Target before track loss occurs. Summarize the killing rate under 
CROP as . ( )Crη
The above decision algorithm is just one, possibly naïve and suboptimal, option, which may 
be improved upon. In the event the detected Target is a decoy (a low-value Target deliberately 
introduced by Red), or a false Target such as a commercial vehicle or truck convoy, i.e., that  
r = 0, there is interest in κ 0*  above as the probability of a wasted weapon. Conversely, if A  
when 
= 0
r π 0 so a Target of value is misclassified as a decoy and not prosecuted there is interest in 
a passed-up shooting opportunity and possibly a subsequent source of damage to Blue by that 
omitted, but very possibly lethal, Target. Red’s use of decoys can certainly degrade Blue’s 
attrition capability, as the model easily shows quantitatively. 
4. Weapons Expenditure 
Weapons expenditure is one cost of Red force prosecution. For the present simplest-possible 
CD model it is possible to provide detailed explicit probabilistic/stochastic information 
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concerning this issue without use of Monte Carlo simulation. More detail can be accommodated 
by Monte Carlo; see the MS in Operations Research thesis (2002) by Johnson. 
Here we summarize results that are formally derived in Appendix A (see expression (A-8)). 
4.1  Mean Weapons Expenditure by Service s Against Target Type r in Time t 
The result is, stated in words 
 
Probability of  Kill + Probability of Miss Mean
Probability of  Kill + Probability of  Other - than - Kill
 multiplied by a damped exponentially - increasing function
of  time, , that approaches o
s -  s -  = 
s - s -
t ne in the long run.
 
   (4.1) 
There are only three basic events the occurrence of which determine s-Weapon expenditure:  
s-Kill, s-Miss, and Other-than-s Kill; an Other-than-s Miss is a non-event in our formulation (the 
time is neglibible compared to the time between detection of a single Target). 
4.2  Variance, and Standard Deviation, of Weapons Expenditure in Time t 
 The result for variance stated in words is as follows.  
( )
Variance plus the square of  the Mean
Probability of Miss
1+ 2
(Probability of  - Kill) + (Probability of  Other - than - - Kill )
Multiplied by the Mean
 plus a term which approaches 0 as  becomes l
 




   
arge.
  (4.2) 
Details can be found in Appendix A. 
5. Numerical Examples 
In Subsections 5.1 and 5.2, we compare SP to CROP survival for a case with perfect 
classification and a case with imperfect classification. 
There are S=3 Services and R=3 Target types. There are 100 Targets of each type in the 
region at time 0. No additional Targets arrive. 
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The loss rate 5rsυ =  per hour for all r and s. The tracking and mensuration, etc., rate 4rsο =  
per hour for each r and s. The detection rates 1/12rsξ =  per hour for each r and s. These 
parameters are used for both SP and CROP throughout. 
5.1 Disparate Probabilities of Kill for Different Target Types for the Services  
In this section we present results for an example in which the probabilities of kill for 
correctly classified Targets are quite different for different Services; that is, the Services are 
specialized. 
The kill probability matrix for each Service is  
Probabilities of Kill 
Service 1 
Classified Target Type  
True Target Type  
1 2 3 
1 0.70 0.125 0.15 
2 0.10 0.60 0.10 
3 0.10 0.10 0.50 
Probabilities of Kill 
Service 2 
Classified Target Type  
True Target Type  
1 2 3 
1 0.15 0.10 0.10 
2 0.15 0.75 0.15 
3 0.05 0.05 0.15 
Probabilities of Kill 
Service 3 
Classified Target Type  
True Target Type  
1 2 3 
1 0.15 0.10 0.10 
2 0.10 0.125 0.10 
3 0.10 0.10 0.6 
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5.1.2 Imperfect Classification 
The Target classification probabilities for the Stove-piped Services are: 
 
Service 1 
Conditional Probability of Classification of Target Type 
Classified Target Type  
True Target Type  
1 2 3 
1 1 0 0 
2 0.25 0.50 0.25 
3 0.25 0.25 0.50 
 
Service 2 
Conditional Probability of Classification of Target Type 
Classified Target Type  
True Target Type  
1 2 3 
1 0.50 0.25 0.25 
2 0 1 0 
3 0.25 0.25 0.50 
Service 3 
Conditional Probability of Classification of Target Type 
Classified Target Type  
True Target Type  
1 2 3 
1 0.50 0.25 0.25 
2 0.25 0.50 0.25 




Classification by Fusion 
Conditional Probability of Classification of Target Type 
Classified Target Type  
True Target Type  
1 2 3 
1 0.80 0.10 0.10 
2 0.10 0.80 0.10 
3 0.10 0.10 0.80 
 
CROP 
The Service that Detects Does Classification 
Conditional Probability of Classification of Target Type 
Classified Target Type  
True Target Type  
1 2 3 
1 0.66 0.17 0.17 
2 0.17 0.66 0.17 
3 0.17 0.17 0.66 
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The mean number of surviving Targets for the Stove-piped Services and CROP with 
imperfect classification and fused classification are displayed below:  
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In this example, Services 2 and 3 each have a particular Target type for which the probability 
of kill is larger than that for the other Services. Services 2 and 3 are relatively ineffective against 
other Target types. Hence, perfect classification does not decrease the mean number of surviving 
Targets over imperfect classification by much for the Stove-pipe (SP) case. The Stove-piped 
Services do not have the weapon capability that can take advantage of perfect Target 
classification. Since at least one Service has a weapon that is effective against each kind of 
Target, the ability of CROP to optimize weapon type to Target type results in a substantial 
decrease in the number of Targets surviving from that of Stove-piped Services. Note that the 
probability that a Target placed on the CROP targeting list is lost is the same as that for each of 
the individual Services. Hence, it is not surprising that CROP, either under imperfect 
classification or perfect classification, results in average numbers of Targets surviving, which are 
smaller than those for the Stove-piped Services architecture at any time. If the probability that a 
Target is lost before it can be fired upon is increased for CROP, the advantage of CROP will 
diminish.  
5.1.3  The Number of Weapons Fired at a Target 
Expressions for moments for the number of weapons fired at a Target until it is killed are 
given in Appendix A. Graphs of the numbers of weapons expended against all Targets of type 1 
are displayed on the following pages. 
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Total Weapons Expended (at Type 1 Targets)
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Once again the disparate abilities of the Stove-piped Services do not allow them to take 
advantage of perfect Target classification. The ability of CROP to “optimize” weapon to Target 
type results in a smaller mean number of weapons fired and smaller variability on the number of 
weapons fired. This CROP ability also allows it to take advantage of perfect Target 
classification. 
5.1.4 Variation of the Mean Targeting C2 Time 
 In this section we present results to study the effect of varying the mean targeting C2 time; 
the mean targeting C2 time is 1/(mensuration, etc., rate). The other parameters are as above. The 
figure on the next page displays the mean number of Targets surviving under Stove-piped 
Service architecture and CROP under imperfect Target classification for a baseline case (mean 
targeting C2 time = 15 minutes), and the cases in which the mean targeting C2 time is 33% 
longer (mean targeting C2 time = 20 minutes), and 100% longer (mean targeting C2 time = 30 
minutes). CROP classification is done with fused classification information. Not surprisingly, the 
mean number of surviving Targets is quite sensitive to the mean targeting C2 time. Since the 
Stove-piped Services do not have weapons that are equally effective against all the Target types, 
the ability of CROP to assign the best weapon to a Target results in a considerable advantage.  
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Total Surviving Targets





























5.2  Comparable Probabilities of Kill for Each Service 
In this example, the probabilities of correct classification under imperfect classification will 
remain the same, but each Service will have roughly comparable kill probabilities. The 
probabilities of kill are as follows: 
Probabilities of Kill 
Service 1 
Classified Target Type  
True Target Type  
1 2 3 
1 0.70 0.125 0.15 
2 0.10 0.60 0.10 
3 0.10 0.10 0.50 
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Probabilities of Kill 
Service 2 
Classified Target Type  
True Target Type  
1 2 3 
1 0.50 0.10 0.10 
2 0.15 0.75 0.15 
3 0.05 0.05 0.50 
Probabilities of Kill 
Service 3 
Classified Target Type  
True Target Type  
1 2 3 
1 0.50 0.10 0.10 
2 0.10 0.50 0.10 
3 0.10 0.10 0.60 
5.2.1 Imperfect Classification 
The figures on the next page display the expected number of Targets surviving for the 
UnCoordinated Services architecture, SP, and for CROP with imperfect Target classification.  
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5.2.2 Perfect Classification 
The figures below display the expected number of Targets surviving for the Stove-piped 
Services architecture and for CROP with perfect Target classification. 
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Discussion 
Comparison of the figure for the Stove-piped Services architecture with perfect classification 
with that for CROP under imperfect classification shows that the mean numbers of Targets 
surviving for the Stove-piped Services architecture with perfect information are smaller than 
those for CROP with imperfect information. Since the probability that a Target is lost under 
CROP is the same as that for the Stove-piped Services architecture, the mean numbers of Targets 
surviving are the smallest for CROP with perfect information. However, since each Service has 
reasonably large probabilities of kill against all the Target types, the advantage of CROP is not 
as large. Once again the advantage to CROP can be decreased if there is an increased targeting 
C2 time associated with CROP. 
5.2.3 Number of Weapons Fired 
Expressions for the mean and variance of the number of weapons fired at a particular Target 
are given in Appendix A.  
Total Weapons Expended (at Type 1 Targets)
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When Stove-piped Services’ Target classification is perfect, CROP Target classification is 
perfect. Perfect Target classification decreases the mean number of weapons shot and the 
variability of the number of weapons shot by about 1/3 over imperfect Target classification. Note 
that the Stove-piped Services architecture with perfect classification has a mean number of 
weapons expended, which is smaller than those for CROP with imperfect Target classification. 
Perfect classification does not mean as much for CROP in this case because the Services’ 
probabilities of kill against a particular correctly classified Target type are roughly comparable. 
Thus, there is not much gained by allocating a particular Target to a “best” Service.  
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5.2.4 Variation of the Mean Targeting C2 Time 
 In this section we present results to study the effect of varying the mean targeting C2 time; 
the mean targeting C2 time is 1/(mensuration, etc., rate). The other parameters are as above. The 
figure below displays the mean number of Targets surviving under Stove-piped Service 
architecture and CROP under imperfect Target classification for a baseline case (mean targeting 
C2 time = 15 minutes), and the cases in which the mean targeting C2 time is 33% longer (mean 
targeting C2 time = 20 minutes), and 100% longer (mean targeting C2 time = 30 minutes). 
CROP classification is done with fused classification information. Not surprisingly, the mean 
number of surviving Targets is quite sensitive to the mean targeting C2 time. Since the Services’ 
probabilities of kill against different Target types are comparable, the advantage of CROP’s 
ability to assign the best weapon to a Target does not result in as large a decrease in the mean 
number of Targets surviving as it has when the Services have different capabilities.  
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6.  Summary and Conclusions 
This paper describes and illustrates use of a high-level, low-resolution (HLLR) stochastic 
model for evaluating the benefits of a Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP). The 
model focuses on the sensor-to-shooter information needed by elements of a joint force to 
engage time critical Targets. CROP capability is compared to the targeting ability of several 
uncoordinated Service forces with their own individual combined Sensor-Shooter systems, but 
which do not share information with other Services, informally called Stove-Piped (SP) 
architecture. The models include realistic random delays or latency caused by congestion or 
system unreliability, random times until Target detection and loss, and a probabilitistic 
representation of the Services’ overall capability to detect, classify and shoot at a varying set of 
different Target types. Our version of a SP model is tilted somewhat unrealistically towards too 
much individual Service isolation, while the CROP model may assume too-efficient information 
coordination. 
In summary, the models’ results support the following conclusions:   
• CROP can increase the number of time-critical Targets killed, sometimes 
considerably. 
• CROP can decrease the mean and variance of the number of weapons expended to 
kill Targets. 
• The benefits of CROP can be degraded if the CROP process requires more time 
from Target detection until weapon arrival at the Target. 
One CROP capability is the ability to “optimize” weapon assignment across Services against 
a perceived Target type. This ability can result in a smaller mean and variance of the number of 
weapons fired. The size of the decrease depends on the effectiveness of each of the SP Services 
against different perceived Target types. If a Service in the SP architecture is relatively 
ineffective against some perceived Target types, then CROP’s ability to assign these Targets to 
another more effective Service can result in significantly fewer weapons expended and more 
Targets killed. However, if the Services in the SP architecture are equally capable against all 
32 
Target types, then the benefit of CROP’s optimal weapon assignment is less. Further, if CROP’s 
optimal weapon assignment requires additional time from Target detection until weapon arrival 
at the Target, then there may be no benefit to the ability to assign a Target to a “best” Service. 
Another CROP capability is the ability to allocate sensor assets, fuse sensor information, and 
pass common targeting information to all Shooters. This can result in shorter Target detection 
times and more accurate Target type classification. The increase in ability to correctly classify a 
Target type decreases the mean and variance of the number of weapons expended for both the SP 
architecture and CROP. However, if this increased capability comes at the price of an increase in 
the C2 targeting time, there may be no benefit.  
In general, the time critical targeting benefit of CROP is sensitive to the time from Target 
detection until weapon arrival at the Target. Even a modest increase in this time can nullify the 
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Appendix A 
Weapons Expenditure Under SP 
 
Here is a simple version of the weapons expenditure problem: 
 
  Number of s-Weapons Fired at an r-Target in Time t = 
 
(a) Number of s-Weapons fired in Time t  
when kill is by s-Weapon Before t        + 
 
(b) Number of s-Weapons Fired in Time t  
When kill is by s , Other-Than-s Weapon Before t       + 
 
(c) Number of s-Weapons Fired in Time t when Target Survives (until t) 
 
This viewpoint provides one-variable (“marginal”) information concerning one type of 
Weapon fired at one member of a Target type. Because of the independence assumed in the CD 
(present version) statistical summaries such as mean, standard deviations and distribution 
transforms such as the generating function can be derived by conditioning. 
 
Mathematical Analysis 
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The η-parameters are summaries of detection and Weapon choice and Shooting (killing, and 
missing) parameters, for example, but not exclusively (there are many alternatives, such as 
Shoot-Look-Shoot with imperfect BDA; see Gaver, et al (1997)). 
In either of the competitive kill cases it is possible that, say, the time until another Service 
kills the Target, oτ is censored because an s-Kill occurs first, s o<τ τ ; but also vice versa. In 
finite time, killing may not occur, so ands oτ τ may both be censored. 
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In the following it is convenient to abbreviate:   
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Generating functions “generate moments” and also can reveal the forms of distributions. If 
 represents the random number of s-Weapons expended by time t against a particular  
r-Target (that Target can be either alive or dead by t), and 
( )Ms t
( )Ms ∞ is the number of shots 
required to finally kill a particular r-Target, then let the generating functions (g.f.) be 
 
( ) ( )
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for convenience abbreviate as , where g sg g= , is the g.f. of s-Weapons.  
Backward Equations 
Note these mutually exclusive possibilities: 
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Note that for this objective we can eliminate reference to Missing by Other-than-s. 
Using (a) through (d) produces a first-order differential equation: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, ,o s s s
s o
d g z t K K M g z t M zg z t
dt
z K K
η η η η
η η
= − + + +
+ +
, +    (A-7) 
Its solution, subject to , and putting ( ),0 1g z = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 1o s sE z K K z Mη η η≡ + + − )  
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, exp 1 exp 1o so s s
K z K




+= − + − − + + − M
1z =
. 
The mean number of s-Weapons expended against the r-Target can be found by differentiation of 
g at  or a direct argument. 
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where ( ) ( )s sp K Kη η= , ( ) ( )s sp M Mη η= , ( ) ( )o op K Kη η=  defining 
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where  and ( ) ( ) ( )1 s sN Kη η= + M ( ) ( ) ( )1 s oE Kη η= + K . 
Letting time, t, become large 
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Note 1:  The formula (A-8) shows that, as t increases indefinitely if ( )sp M , the probability of  
s-Weapon Miss exceeds ( )op K , the probability of Other-than-s Weapon Kill, then the mean 
number of s-Weapons expended until Target kill exceeds one, whereas if the inequality is 
reversed the mean numbers of weapons to kill is less than one.   
 
Note 2:  The probabilities of first-kill and miss, ( )sp M , depend only upon the ratios of 
detection rates or sums thereof. This means that if rates are simultaneously affected by common 
“environmental” conditions, interpreted broadly, the probabilities, and hence the mean, and also 
variance of weapons expenditure needed to kill a particular Target is relatively insensitive to 
common environmental conditions. Of course this does not extend to the time to kill, or the 
number killed in a fixed time. 
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Appendix B 
A Bayesian Model for Data Fusion Under CROP 
 Here is a Bayesian methodology representing the fused system-level classification conducted 
by CROP.  
Consider a single Target. Let { }0,1,...R∈Z denote its type. Let ( )sC  be the classification of 
Target type by the sensors of Service s, { }1,...s ∈ S . The conditional distribution of ( )sC  given 
 is Z ( ) ( ) ({ ) }, ( )r j sc s P s j≡ =C |s r=Z . The joint probability distribution of the identifications 
made (independently) by the various Services is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) ,
1
1 1 , 2 2 ,..., |
,
S
r j s r j S
s
P j j S j S




C C C Z r=
   (B-1) 
where ( )j S  is the vector of individual classifications, and which assumes conditional 
independence between classifications by Services; (the Services do their own internal fusion). 
B.1 Joint/Mutual Classification, Based on Combined Data 
 Bayes’ formula evaluates of the probability that a Target is type k, given observations (Target 
classifications)  by the S Services:  If( ) ( ) ( )1 ,..., ,...,j j s j S { }; 0,...k kπ = I denotes a fixed prior 
on the type of Target, the conditional posterior probability a Target is of type k given the Service 
classifications  is ( ) ( ) ( )1 ,..., ,...,j j s j S
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )






k ik j S i j S
i






= ∑ S     (B-2) 
for k=1,2,…,I. A non-informative prior assigns probability 1/R to each Target type. 
 Targets are detected; the probability that a target is type r is αr. Each Service classifies the 
Target. On the basis of these classifications (observations), Bayes is used to find the probability 
that the Target is a type k. The conditional probability a Target of type r is assessed as a type k 
under CROP, based on the observations (Target classifications) of all the Services, is 
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Example 1:  There are three Target types for each Service, and there are three Services. Assume, 
for one example, that each Service can perfectly classify one type of Target and cannot 
distinguish the other types of Targets. The classification matrices for the different Services are as 
follows. 
 Service 1 Service 2 Service 3 
Classified 
Tgt. Type 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
True Tgt. 
Type 
         
1 1 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
2 0 0.5 0.5 0 1 0 0.5 0.5 0 
3 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 1 
With the non-informative prior (the probabilities a Target is of type i, i=1,2,3, are 1/3), the 
Bayesian classification probabilities for each Service separately are the same as the conditional 
classification probabilities. The Bayesian classification probabilities for the three Services 
combined (“fused”) result in perfect classification. 
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All Three Services 
Assessed 
Tgt. Type
1 2 3 
True Tgt. 
Type    
1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.00 1.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Example 2:  Alternatively, there are three types of Targets and each Service has the following 
classification probabilities: 
 Service 1 Service 2 Service 3 
Classified 
Tgt. Type 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
True Tgt. 
Type 
         
1 1 0 0 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 
2 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 1 0 0.25 0.50 0.25 
3 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.50 0 0 1 
In this example, there are positive probabilities that Service 1 will misclassify Targets of types 2 
and 3 as type 1 Targets. Assume the prior probability that a Target is of type i is 1/3 for i=1,2,3.  
 Using only information from Service 1, the conditional probability a target is classified as a 




1 2 3 
True Tgt. 
Type    
1 0.67 0.17 0.17 
2 0.17 0.46 0.38 
3 0.17 0.38 0.46 
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1 2 3 
True Tgt. 
Type    
1 0.46 0.17 0.38 
2 0.17 0.67 0.17 




1 2 3 
True Tgt. 
Type    
1 0.46 0.38 0.17 
2 0.38 0.46 0.17 
3 0.17 0.17 0.67 
Combining information from all three Services using the above non-informative prior 
distribution results in the following conditional probability of Target classification given Target 
type. 
All Three Services 
Assessed 
Tgt. Type
1 2 3 
True Tgt. 
Type    
1 0.79 0.10 0.10 
2 0.10 0.79 0.10 
3 0.10 0.10 0.79 
 In general, the application of Bayes with an uninformative prior appears superior to the 
classification of one Service alone. If valid information concerning {αr} were available, and if, 




Non-Stationary Poisson Arrivals to the Battlespace 
 Targets of type r arrive to a region according to a Poisson process with intensity function 
. Assume targets can also leave the region. Let U  be the time the ith Target spends in 
the region if it is not killed. Assume U  are independent identically distributed random 
variables with distribution function  independent of the actions of the Services and the other 
Targets. Let (a) be the number of type r live Targets in the region at time t; (b) 
( )r tλ ,i r
,i r
rF
( )Nr t ( )Dr t be 
the number of type r Targets killed in ( ]0, ;t (c) ( )Ar t be the number of type r Targets to depart 
the region alive in ( ]0, t . The random variables ( ) ( ) ( ), , Art tN Dr r t  are independent and each 







( ) ( ) )r rs oK Kη η (r Kη= + , the rate at which a Target of type r is killed, in the notation of 
Appendix A. 
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Let be the total number of weapons fired by Service s at Targets of type r 
during (
( )Mrs t
]0, t . Expressions for the mean, ( )rsm t , and variance, ( )rsv t , of the number of weapons 
fired by Service s at one Target of type r that is initially present and never leaves the region until 
a kill occurs appear in Appendix A. Similar expressions can be obtained in a similar manner for 




The generating function of the total number of weapons fired at Targets type r (that is 
available for detection since t ) by Service s is0= ( ) ( ),rs t rsE z g z t  ≡  M ;  see (A-8). For 
convenience, write . ( ) rsg z t g= ( ), ,z t
Departure from Region Time U  r
A unit of type r may well leave the battlespace, B, either because of presumed threat, inferred 
from Blue attack frequency, or because endurance limits are exceeded. Here model the available 
time in B as U , measured from a unit entry instant, with distribution ; let all versions of 
 for different individuals be independent and identically distributed. By conditioning, then, 
the modified (A-8) generating function is  
r ( )rF u
rU
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   (C-4) 
again drop subscripts. Differentiation at =  produces moments. 
Generating Function of Total Weapons Fired (By Blue Service s at Red Unit Types that 
Have Occupied B during ( ]0, t ) 
Let  denote the generating function of all weapons fired by Service s at Red 
Targets of type r that have ever entered, and still remain in B during 
( ; ,rsG z u t )
( ],u t ; if u  then put 
for short. A straightforward backward equation argument, shows that 
0=
( ) (; rst G z= )0,;rsG z t
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
; 1 , ,
t
G z t exp - t g z t u p u t du
   = Λ − −      ∫     (C-5) 
where  and( ) ( )
0
t
t uλΛ = ∫  du ( ) ( ) ( ),p u t u tλ= Λ , for 0 u t≤ ≤ . 
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Moments:  Mean and Variance of Weapons Expended 
Since, by, (C-5) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
; 1 , ,
t
ln G z t - t g z t u p u t du
 = Λ − −   ∫     (C-6) 




tln G z t gt z t u p u t
z z
∂ ∂= Λ −∂ ∂∫   du     (C-7) 
and at  the expection/mean of the total number of weapons fired at type r Red Targets 
during (0,t], 
1z =
( ) ( )M Mr r
s
t t= ∑ s , is  




r r rE t t m t u p u  = Λ −  ∫  du     (C-8) 
where is the mean number of Blue weapons shot during ( )1rm t ( ]0, t  at one type r Red Target 
that is in the region at time 0.  
Since we can show that 
 





ln G z t
z Var
z z =
∂ ∂ t =   ∂ ∂ 
    (C-9) 
then from (C-7) 
 




r rt t m t u p u du  = Λ −  ∫  rVar    (C-10) 
where  is the second moment of the number of Blue weapons fired during( )2rm t ( ]0, t  at a type r 
Red Target that is in the region at time 0; it can be derived from the first and second derivatives 
of  at . ( ), t zg z 1=
By straightforward (tedious) backward equation arguments one gets 
 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 r K tr rs r r
s
m t E t K M e ηη η − = = + −     ∑ M   (C-11) 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
















m t E t e
K







η η ηη η η
−
−
    + = = −         
 +  − +   +   
∑
  (C-12) 
where ( ) (r rs
s
)M Mη η= ∑  in the notation of Appendix A. 
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